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ABSTRACT 
Scientists and engineers have expressed concern that 
continued release of co2 into the atmosphere from the consumption of
hydrocarbon fuels may cause significant, undesirable climatic change, 
warming the earth's atmosphere by one to four degrees in the next 
century. This paper is addressed to the issue of developing a way 
to think about this problem, and a research plan that would most 
effectively illuminate public policy choices related to co2 emissions 
in the coming decades. Special emphasis is placed on learning more 
about the responsiveness to drastic changes in economic and 
environmental circumstances of the industries and localities that 
are most likely to be affected, and how this responsiveness could 
be improved by selected government policy actions. Attention is also 
given to the kinds of scientific and engineering research that would 
most contribute to society's ability to plan its defense against a 
prospective man-made change in climate, 
ADAPTIVE APPROACHES TO THE,C02 PROBLEM 
Roger G. Noll* 
Attempting to assess the likely effe�ts of atmospheric 
warming due to co2 emissions and the possible mitigating actions that 
could be taken by government is a formidable task. Relatively little 
is known about the relationship between climate and human welfare; 
moreover, the problem of forecasting the consequences of a change in 
climate outside the range of human experiences is extraordinarily 
complex and difficult. The path that society is likely to follow is 
to gain more information as time passes, and, as the most probable 
outcomes begin to emerge, to begin to take actions based upon them. 
Most of the emissions that will cause the projected atmospheric warming 
will come decades into the future. Even though many of the possible 
defensive actions require long-term planning, extensive research, and 
major new capital investments, there appears to be sufficient time to 
learn more about the problem before decisions have to be made about 
taking costly defensive actions. The purpose of this paper is to help 
formulate a plan of research and information gathering that will allow 
* 
The author is indebted to Mark Rosker for research assistance in 
preparing this manuscript, to J. A. Laurmann for help in understanding 
technical aspects of the problem, to Lester Lave for making several 
useful suggestions about the way to approach the topic, and to Ralph 
d'Arge and Larry Ruff for helpful comments on an early draft. 
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us in a few years to be able to assess more accurately the nature of the 
problem, and the policy options availa9le to society for attacking it. 
STATING THE PROBLEM 
The policy-planning problem associated with the co2 greenhouse 
effect can usefully be segmented into three parts. The first is 
essentially technical: figuring out the likely path of the earth's 
climate during the next hundred years or so. Current information is 
sufficient to make us suspect that there is a good chance that 
substantial atmospheric warming will take place, but we do not know very 
precisely how much, nor do we have much more than vague hints about the 
details of climatic change that are likely to come about. Thus, at 
present society faces numerous possible alternative futures. A central 
feature of the policy-planning problem is that uncertainty about the 
technical, scientific aspects of the greenhouse effect is great now, 
and even with the best research efforts will continue to be significant 
for years, indeed decades, to come. As long as this uncertainty 
persists, society is unlikely to make major changes in the economic 
system or reduce co2 emissions or to prepare for a change in climate. 
The second aspect of the problem is to examine how the co2 
buildup is likely to affect human society, assuming that neither 
national nor international governmental actions are taken to abate 
or ameliorate the greenhouse effect and its consequences. Initially, 
this requires examining the sensitivity of the economic system as it 
is currently constituted to prospective climatic changes. Then, this 
baseline analysis needs to be refined to take account of the adjustments 
3 
that humans are likely to make in economic activities and patterns of 
population distribution as the climate changes and a new socioeconomic 
regime takes hold. 
The third aspect of the problem is to examine how public 
policies can generate new, possibly better alternatives than would 
naturally take place. The policy-planning problem is twofold: one 
part consists of issues relating to the transition to a new climatic 
regime, while another relates to selecting--to the extent possible--
the new climatic pattern and the socioeconomic system that will in 
some sense represent the equilibrium adjustment to it. 
Because the range of possible climatic outcomes is very 
wide, analysts cannot now be very specific about the kinds of questions 
that should be asked in examining the second and third aspects of the 
problem, For reasons discussed later in this paper, there is little 
payoff to attempting to figure out optimal agricultural patterns for 
every climate that might be possible within the limits of current 
gross predictions in overall warming. As more technical information 
is gained, some climatic outcomes that are now regarded as possible 
will be eliminated. This will ease the problem of identifying 
plausible alternative socioeconomic outcomes and policy options. 
Nevertheless, some things can be examined now. These include 
general methodological--tool building--questions that need to be 
answered in order to attack more specific questions later. In 
addition, they include using and expanding available information 
on the effect of key climatic variables on major climate-dependent 
activities in order to identify critical ranges or thresholds of 
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these variables that would threaten the viability of these activities 
or require major readjustments. They also include research on the 
general issue of the responsiveness of the human institutions that 
are likely to be affected by climatic change. 
Regardless of the actual climatic pattern that may emerge 
a hundred years hence, to undertake rational policy planning will 
require some notion of how individual citizens and their organizations 
will respond to climate change and to government policies that are 
directed at the problem. The human activities that are most likely 
to be affected directly by major climatic change are easy to 
identify: agriculture, energy use, fisheries, water resource systems, 
tourism, transportation, construction, defenses against diseases and 
pests, and migration. These are the specific areas in which the 
responsiveness issues are most germane. 
Other research issues cannot be attacked profitably until 
more information is obtained about the technical issues. In these 
cases, the value of specific technical research projects is related 
to the kinds of social scientific and policy research that they make 
feasible. Hence the selection of technical research priorities should 
be based in part upon how they are linked to important socioeconomic 
questions. 
Finally, the answers to the technical questions about future 
climate depend in part on the resolution of other economic and political 
issues. The pattern of economic development, influenced by policy 
decisions--especially in energy, environmental, agricultural and water 
resource policies--will affect co2 emissions, and hence the magnitude 
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of the climate effect, even if no policies are implemented with the 
co2 issue specifically in mind. 
The remainder of this paper.takes up each of these potential 
areas of research in more detail. 
BASIC RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC THEORY 
The first question to be addressed is whether the co2 issue 
raises any special problems that cannot readily be incorporated into 
conventional economic theory. It would appear that as far as the 
management of the atmosphere as a resource is concerned, this is not 
the case. The theoretical challenges have more to do with picking 
a learning strategy and deciding when (if ever) to take positive 
defensive actions. 
The atmosphere can be regarded as a standard economic 
resource that enters into production activities and that can be 
degraded by pollution. At a basic theoretical level, the problem 
of analyzing an optimal rate of co2 emissions does not appear to be 
different in a major way from other environmental management problems 
in which the damaging effects of a pollutant are cumulative. Thus, 
the basic analytical tools developed in the literatures about optimal 
rates of exploitation of a natural resource:-/ and about the problem 
_/ For example, see Partha Dasgupta and Geoffrey Heal, "The Optimal 
Depletion of Exhaustible Resources, " Review of Economic Studies 
Symposium (1974); and Glenn C. Loury, "The Optimal Exploitation of 
an Unknown Reserve, " Review of Economic Studies 45 (October 1978). 
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of managing environmental externalities-
/ 
seem to be appropriate 
_/ See, for example, R. V. Ayres and A. V. Kneese, "Production, 
Consumption and Externalities, " American Economic Review 59 (June 
1969); and David Starret, "Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theory 
of Externalities, " Journal of Economic Theory 4 (April 1972). 
f oundations on which to build a conceptual analysis of the co2 problem. 
The thrust of theoretical work in resource economics is to find a time 
path of the use of resources that maximizes the discounted present 
value of the future stream of economic output, taking account of some 
costs, such as environmental degradation, which the normal market 
system does not take into proper account. Further work that incorporates 
the special features of the co2 problem into this general theoretical 
framework is justified to be sure that these special characteristics 
will produce no analytical results that are surprises. Although there 
are other possible outcomes, the expected result is that, indeed, there 
will exist an optimal rate of atmospheric warming in the sense of 
maximizing economic wealth, but that it is less than would occur in the
absence of policy interventions. The precise nature of the optimal 
path of co2 emissions will depend upon the details of how the costs of 
controlling them and the costs of atmospheric warming accrue over time. 
Thus, to be helpful, extension and adaptation of existing theory should 
be solidly grounded in the special features of the co2 problem. 
Recently Heal has begun some work to adapt the standard 
theoretical literature to man-made climatic change.-/ While the 
I . - Geoffrey Heal, "Interactions between Economy and Climate: A 
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Framework for Policy Design under Uncertainty, " prepared for RfF 
Workshop on the Methodology of Economic Impact Analysis for Climate 
Change, April 1980. 
work shows promise, a central assumption of the model appears to apply 
to only a limited extent to the co2 problem and therefore to risk 
producing misleading results. The assumption is that atmospheric 
warming should be viewed as a discrete catastrophic event--that is, 
that up to some point co2 emissions have no effect, and then pass a 
threshold that causes a climatic catastrophe. The threshold can 
either be known with certainty, or uncertain but with a knowable 
probability of occurrence that depends on cumulative co2 emissions. 
While this assumption applies to the possibility of a sudden break-up 
of the ice shelves of Antarctica, an event that would cause sudden 
low-land flooding, or to the possibility that there exist thresholds 
of climatic effects on certain agricultural activities, it does not 
apply to a continuous relationship between economic effects and the 
climatic changes that are believed to result from a continuing increase 
in atmospheric co2 concentration. 
The obvious next step is to make damage (perhaps stochastic 
damages) depend on cumulated emissions in a continuous, rather than 
discrete, way. In addition, the damages could be made to depend on 
the rate of climate change as well as absolute climate characteristics, 
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represent1ng in a general fashion the possibility that slower rates 
of change are more amenable to compensating adjustments in 
product ive activities that depend on climate. The literature on the 
exploitation of renewable resources is also potentially applicable to 
take account of absorption of co2 into the ocean or the biomass should 
technical research indicate that these effects are important elements 
in stabilizing co2 concentration in the atmosphere through a possible 
negative feedback effect. 
Economic theoretic models of the optimal use of a resource, 
with or without the possibility of irreversible catastrophes, abstract 
from one essential feature of the co2 problem, that knowledge about 
the nature of the effect and about ways to adjust to it is likely 
to improve over time. This creates a decision problem for policymakers 
that economic theory does not provide a great insight about: when to 
postpone decisions in order to learn more, when to take action because 
the risks of further delay outweigh the gains in knowledge that delay 
would bring, and how to trade off actions to build in flexibility to 
respond to unanticipated events compared to actions that optimize 
against the expected state of affairs. Economic theory is likewise 
unable to provide much insight about how a policymaker should compare 
differential impacts of change across different categories of people, 
whether within one country, among several countries, or among 
generations into the indefinite future. On all of these issues, the 
best that can realistically be expected from economists is solid 
empirical work that lays out the range of possible consequences of 
alternative actions, including geographic and international shifts in 
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relative wealth that may be potential sources of political and military 
conflict. It is not realistic to expect of economic theory some new 
flash of insight about how and when to ·take global policy actions on 
the basis of this information . 
RESEARCH ON RESPONSIVENESS 
In assessing the dimensions of the co2 problem, a key issue 
is the extent to which human society can adjust to dramatic changes 
in climate. Productive activities that depend in an important way 
on climatic variables can be regarded as having been designed to 
produce an efficient transformation of inputs into outputs for a 
"normal" range of climatic variation. In this sense, technologies 
have a certain amount of built-in flexibility. However, in organizing 
productive activities, individual economic agents are likely to find 
that it does not make sense to take account of all conceivable 
weather patterns. Some will occur too infrequently or would require 
contingent plans that, are too complex and costly to make it worthwhile 
to build in some accommodation for them. Individual decisionmakers 
will elect to make "optimally imperfect" decisions-
/ 
-- that is, to 
I 
-· William J. Baumol and Richard E. Quandt, "Rules of Thumb and Optimally 
Imperfect Decisions, " American Economic Review SS (March 1964 ). 
avoid planning for possible situations for which the expected benefit 
of a contingent coping strategy is small compared to the cost of 
preparing and implementing it. 
10 
If one studies the effect of a drastic climatic change by 
examining how a dramatic shift in climate would affect existing 
activities, the result is bound to overstate the severity of the 
impact. A change in climate of the magnitude predicted from co2 build­
up in the atmosphere would alter what is regarded as "normal" variation 
in the conditions of production, incorporating into this range some 
conditions that previously were regarded as remote contingencies. 
When a new definition of normal variation is developed, production 
methods w ill adjust (perhaps slowly if new knowledge must be acquired) 
until efficient technologies are adopted for converting inputs to 
outputs in the new regime. 
The economic effects of a major climatic change can 
conveniently be divided into three components: the direct impact, 
the adjustment cost, and the equilibrium effect. 
The first component is the direct impact: the effect on 
economic activity that takes place before economic agents have had a 
chance to respond. For example, a climatic change that consisted of 
narrowing the variance of weather about the same mean -- reducing the 
frequency of extreme conditions -- would probably increase economic 
welfare in the short run. Eventually, the beneficial impact would be 
larger, as agents adjusted by avoiding the expense of some of the built­
in flexibility of the old methods. Normally, of course, the direct 
impact can be expected to be harmful. Existing production technologies 
will tend to be optimized for existing climates, and dramatic changes 
in climates are unlikely to be as friendly as the preceding example. 
The magnitude of the direct impact will depend on the delay 
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in the response of economic agents to changed conditions. Response 
may be delayed because agents do not realize a change has taken place, 
because institutional barriers inhibit .a response, or, as in the case 
of an unanticipated, catastrophic event such as an unpredicted break­
up of Antarctic ice shelves, because the speed of the change is faster 
than any conceivable mitigating response. 
Once a response is begun, the second cost is faced, the 
adjustment cost: the expense of adopting the new modes of economic 
activity--the investments, the research, etc. Accompanying the 
investment that is involved in the adjustment cost, but not an element 
of it, is the loss of wealth that arises from the unanticipated early 
obsolescence of some capital investments. But it is important to 
realize that early obsolescence could be a consequence of a beneficial 
change as well as an unbeneficial one. The new climatic regime could 
increase the productivity of all climate-related activities, but 
rearrange the ranking of them in terms of net profitability at a 
particular locality. In this case, early obsolescence of the old 
capital and investment in the new would be in response to an opportunity 
for even greater returns than had been anticipated. The loss of wealth 
in the old capital would then be more than off set by an increase in the 
productivity of other resources, notably the locations that had 
experienced an across-the-board increase in the rate at which inputs 
could be transformed into outputs. Alternatively, if the climatic 
change causes an across-the-board decline in net output, the 
obsolescence effect will be only a part of the loss. In addition, 
there will be a loss in the productivity -- and hence the value -- of 
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locations that suffer the decline. 
The magnitude of the adjustment cost will depend on the 
speed of the climatic change and the realization that it is taking 
place. If change is slow and anticipated, investments in new production 
methods can take place slowly, in tempo with the standard replacement 
of old capital. These adjustments will be facilitated if the economy 
is healthy and has well developed capital markets, creating attractive 
conditions for investments. Adjustments can also be gradual enough to 
avoid scale diseconomies and bottlenecks in new capital construction 
and to take advantage of learning curves in new production methods 
before wholesale commitment to a particular production technology is 
made. One element of adjustment costs is the mistakes that will be 
made in finding a satisfactory adjustment to the change. 
Adjustments to a new climatic regime can take many forms. 
One is to reshuffle the geographic distribution of various productive 
activities. Although this entails no net addition to knowledge about 
production methods, it does require that some people learn methods 
that are new to them. In poorer countries with relatively little 
education, reeducation can be a formidable' barrier to adjustment. 
In developed societies with relatively high capital per 
worker, adjustment also entails substantial capital investments to the 
extent that capital is geographically immobile and is not readily 
switched from one productive use to another. Neidercorn-1 has examined 
_/ John Neidercorn, "The Capital costs of Climatically Induced Shifts: 
The Example of the American Corn Belt, " in T. Ferrar, ed., The Value 
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Costs of Climate Modification, Wiley, 1976. 
an example of one such possibility. He.has estimated the capital costs 
of moving the midwestern corn belt--in response to a cooling of the 
atmosphere--by figuring out which kinds of capital investments (1) are 
required for corn, (2) are not required for the crops it would displace 
in the South or be displaced by in the Midwest, and (3) cannot be 
relocated at a cost that is less than complete reconstruction. 
A second adjustment method is to make a compensating change 
in production methods for engaging in essentially the same activity. 
This may involve substantial capital investments, such as the 
introduction of water storage and irrigation systems in response to 
reduced rainfall, or it may involve relatively simple changes such as 
adopting a different seed variety, or changing planting and harvesting 
dates. As with the first type of adjustment, this is easier in societies 
with better educational and communications systems. 
A third adaptive response is to respond creatively by 
generating new knowledge about how to make the best use of the new 
climatic situation. This will involve research expenditures and 
experimentation, followed by capital investments that are designed 
to apply the new knowledge, and is therefore most likely to appear 
quickly in the most developed societies. 
The third component of the costs of climate change is the 
equilibrium effect: the difference in the value of economic output 
between the use of the old methods in the old climate and the use of 
new methods in the new climate. Like the other effects, the 
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equilibrium effect can be either positive or negative; there is no 
particular reason to believe that the present state of the atmosphere 
is optimal from the point of view of human welfare. Indeed, in 
extrapolating Neidercorn's analysis, Laurmann has concluded that a 
small amount of warming would lead to a more productive equilibrium 
in agriculture,-
/ 
although, as the author states, the conclusion is 
_
/ 
J. A. Laurmann, "Assessing the Importance of co2 Induced Climate 
Change Using Risk Benefit Analysis," to appear in Energy-Climate 
Interactions, Reidel Press. 
highly speculative. 
Most of the work on the consequences of co2 build-up focuses 
on the equilibrium effect. This may be misplaced emphasis, especially 
at present, given the enormous uncertainties in any attempt to ascertain 
what the new equilibrium will be. If, as seems likely, both direct 
and adjustment costs will begin to be incurred before the new 
equilibrium is known with much precision, then focusing on how one can 
adjust to change more expeditiously and ,efficiently has potentially 
great payoff. Indeed, if institutional barriers preclude much 
effective action to prevent climatic change, the value of better 
knowledge about adjustment possibilities is especially great, and 
knowledge of the equilibrium effect is valuable only in that it 
contributes to minimizing direct and adjustment costs.
The responsiveness issue relates to the first two elements of 
the cost of co2 buildup -- the direct impact and the adjustment cost.
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Responsiveness refers to the extent to which agents will act to minimize 
the sum of the direct impact and adjustment cost associated with the 
change in climate. The importance of the responsiveness issue lies in 
its relationship to the choice of policy options. Meyer-Abich has 
usefully classified potential policy responses into three categories: 
prevention, compensation, and adaptation.-/ Altering his definitions 
_
/ 
Klaus M. Meyer-Abich, "Socioeconomic Impacts of co2-Induced Climate 
Changes and the Comparative Chances of Alternative Political Responses: 
Prevention, Compensation, and Adaptation," Climate Change 2 (1980). 
slightly, in the following discussion prevention refers to eliminating 
or reducing co2 production by severely curtailing the combustion of 
hydrocarbon fuels; compensation refers to massive efforts at technological 
fixes, such as the deposition of co2 in the ocean, major investments 
in irrigation systems, or a research effort to develop new species that 
are better adapted to the new climate;-1 and adjustment means relying 
_
/ 
For several ideas for technical fixes, see Freeman J. Dyson, 
"Technical Fixes for the Climatic Effects of co2,
11 in Walter P. Elliot 
and Lester Machta, eds., Carbon Dioxide Effects Research and Assessment 
Program: Workshop on the Global Effects of Carbon Dioxide from Fossil 
Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy, Document CONF-770385 UC-1.1: NTIS, 
May 1979. 
on individuals to adapt to climate change without placing special. 
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emphasis on this problem other than to facilitate their adjustment. 
These strategies are not mutually exclusive -- a tax on co2 emissions, 
for example, would probably cause both some reduction in fuel burning 
(prevention) and some attempts to reduce emissions when fuel is burned 
(compensation). The choice of a mix of policies among these categories 
will depend on several things. One is the certainty of undesirable 
consequences of co2 buildup. The massive expenditures required for 
prevention or compensation are unlikely to be undertaken by government 
u�less the threat of co2 buildup is perceived to be both large and 
highly likely. Moreover, because undertaking these investments will 
take a long time, the effects of co2 buildup are likely to be felt in
a major way even if society eventually undertakes prevention or 
compensation. Thus, some consideration of policies to facilitate 
adaptation is valuable even in this case, the exact amount depending on 
the extent to which adaptation can be expected to take place, and on 
the extent to which government policies to facilitate adaptation can 
be effective at reasonable cost. 
Several useful avenues of inquiry could be pursued now that 
would be potentially important to policymaking in this area by 
answering questions about the likely extent of natural adjustment and 
the costs and effectiveness of policies to facilitate adjustment. The 
general idea is to examine previous episodes of major changes in the 
environment in which economic agents have operated. This can be useful 
not only to gauge the overall or typical patterns of adaptation to 
changes, but also to examine the effects on the response to drastic 
changes of differences in the structure of affected organizations, in 
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the kinds of responses that are called for, in the sophistication of 
the people involved, in the degree of certainty that a change has 
taken place, and in the general state.of the society -- the health of 
its economy, its political stability, its level of development. 
The kinds of examples of changes that one seeks to study are 
major alterations in the availability of resources to a large group of 
people. The inquiry need not be limited to shifts in climate, and 
indeed these may not be the most interesting cases. Truly long-term 
shifts in climate are infrequent, and distant historical examples 
suffer from their questionable applicability to the modern situation 
and from the paucity of good information about the actual pattern of 
responses to the change. Studies of recent climatic events--prolonged 
droughts, catastrophic weather disasters--are of limited usefulness 
because the changes are not permanent. These represent the extreme 
contingencies that, before the fact, agents may not find it rational 
to plan for as completely as they would if these events were more 
common, and that, after the fact, can be regarded as of too short a 
duration to warrant a significant response or to be of much value for 
indicating long-term responsiveness. 
The objectives of studies of drastic change should be to 
improve our knowledge of the responsiveness of human activity to events 
that are analogous to the co2 buildup. It would, incidentally, give 
some perspective on the magnitude of the co2 problem in comparison to 
other kinds of changes that society regularly faces, 
The essential characteristics of the co2 problem in terms of 
the way it will affect individuals appear to be as follows: the effect 
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will be permanent and out of control of individual economic agents; the 
effect will cause dramatic, unanticipated local changes in the relative 
profitability of some goods and services; the optimal adjustment 
strategy is likely to involve major new investments, significant changes 
in production methods, and the development of new business relations; 
and at the beginning there may be considerable uncertainty about whether 
and how the effect has actually been manifested. The fact that the co2 
problem is related to climate, per se, does not seem to be an essential 
characteristic at the level of studying the individual responses to 
the kind of changes that it will cause. 
Several types of permanent, dramatic changes could be 
profitably studied. Agriculture, which probably will be the sector 
that will be most affected by dramatic shifts in climate, is often 
subjected to other important changes. A recent example is 
pesticide bans. One could profitably examine the various kinds of 
responses--changes in crops, changes in methods of cultivation, 
switches to other pesticides--made to a banning of a major pesticide, 
and how the speed and effectiveness of response varied according to 
the nature of the affected farms (large .. versus small, family versus 
corporate) . Another example would be major changes in markets for 
agricultural commodities, such as occur when major changes are made 
in trade barriers. How did European farmers respond to the development 
of the Common Market? How have North American farmers responded to 
the introduction of trade with eastern bloc countries? 
The analogy between these events and climate change is as 
follows. Regardless of the source of change, responsive farmers would 
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be adopting techniques that were well known to others, but that were 
new to them. A major new market for agricultural output shifts the 
relative profitability of various commddities, inducing changes in the 
pattern of agricultural production and the development of the 
infrastructure to accommodate the new trade patterns. Climate change 
would have a similar impact: productivity changes would change the 
structure of agricultural prices, farmers would change crop patterns, 
and the markets served by a particular area would be likely to shift. 
To the extent that climate change did not entail the development of 
new crop varieties, but represented a redistribution of the patterns 
of cultivation, the process would be similar. Indeed, if climate 
change is slow enough, the resulting rates of change in productivity 
and relative prices might not be much different from the effects of 
changes in markets and technology that occur for other reasons. 
Another potentially fruitful object of study would be changes 
that directly alter productivity, as would a climate change. An example 
is the diffusion of major innovations in agriculture, whether the 
"Green Revolution" in India or the development of hybrid seeds and 
mechanization in the United States in the last hundred years. The 
literature on technological diffusion contains several examples of 
relatively systematic studies of responsiveness. Questions about the 
likely speed of diffusion in different market contexts and by different 
types of organizations have been explored, including questions about 
the role of policy (such as agricultural extension services).-
/ 
_I The standard reference on the general question of diffusion is 
Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Innovation: 
An Econometric Analysis, Norton, 1968. An especially interesting 
detailed study is John Tilton, The Diffusion of Technological 
Innovation: The Case of Semiconductors, Brookings, 1972. For 
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agriculture, see Zvi Grilliches, "Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the 
Economics of Technological Change," Econometrica (October 1957), and 
Charles Rosenberg, "Science, Technology and Economic Growth: The 
Case of the Agricultural Experiment Station Scientist," Agricultural 
History 45 (January 1971). 
Another example of changes that affect productivity directly 
are changes in the fertility of agricultural regions. One case is 
the development of major irrigation projects. Another is long-term 
declines in soil fertility, either because of salt deposits from 
irrigation as in the Central Valley of California or because of soil-
depleting cultivation techniques, especially in less developed areas. 
Outside of agriculture, the major sectoral effects of co2 
buildup generally take the form of major climate-induced shifts in 
demand. The effects on energy use, public services, water resource 
systems and transportation, for example, are in large measure questions 
about the ability of infrastructural sectors to change capacity. The 
major analogous situations arise in areas that experience large changes 
in population. The recent depopulation of parts of the Midwest, or 
rapid population growth in the South and West--especially boomtowns--
offer opportunities for studying these adjustments. 
In parallel with studies of specific events that might be 
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analogous to climatic change should be the development of better 
theoretical understanding of the relationship of organizational 
structure to responsiveness. Indeed, a continuing interplay between 
the theoretical and empirical inquiries is necessary for making 
optimal progress on developing a capacity to evaluate adaptive policy 
actions. 
The literature in organization theory is interesting and 
provocative, but generally somewhat vague and diffuse. Relatively 
little progress has been made in generating testable, quantitative 
hypotheses about the relationships between structure and performance. 
Nevertheless, some suggestive literature exists on the relationship 
of special interest here, that between the structure and day-to-day 
activities of an organization and its ability to adapt to new situations.-
/ 
_
/ 
The best general literature on organizations includes James G. 
March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, Wiley, 1958, and Peter M. 
Blau and Richard A. Schoenhen, The Structure of Organizations, Basic 
Books, 1971. Interesting applications to the adaptiveness issue 
include T. Burns and G. Stalker, The Management of Innovation, 
Tavistock, 1966, Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, 1963, and Herbert Shepard, 
"Innovation-Resisting and Innovation-Producing Organizations," Journal 
of Business 40 (196 7). 
The hope here is twofold: that more adaptive organizations could be 
established (especially in the public sector), and that government 
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policies could be designed to overcome inertia in private organizations. 
The final element of a research program oriented towards 
responsiveness would be to examine institutional barriers to adaptation-­
especially political and policy barriers--and policy changes that might 
enhance adaptiveness. The role of information in a mitigating strategy 
is crucial, for it is an important determinant of the direct impact 
costs that arise from delayed response. Policy options should be 
examined that would permit dissemination of information about the 
likely future path of atmospheric warming and the range of effective 
responses that are available. This will facilitate long-term planning 
by people and organizations who should adjust capital investment plans 
to the new climatic regime. 
Several institutional barriers can retard adaptiveness even 
in the face of relative good climatic forecasts. One would be the 
unavailability of credit, especially in less developed countries. 
Another would be international barriers to migration, or to new 
patterns of trade that might be developed to take advantage of changing 
economic potentials in various parts of the world. Still another is 
price controls, particularly in agriculture and energy, that might 
interfere with sending decisionmakers the proper market signals about 
changes in the production costs of different goods and services. The 
history of the political response of the United States to rapidly rising 
oil prices in the 1970s is instructive, for it reveals the incentives 
operating on the political system to retard unexpected shifts in 
relative prices. Yet, as has been illustrated by the energy problem, 
price controls in the face of uncontrollable changes in the relative 
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costs of commodities seriously retard the adjustment of the economic 
system to economize on the items that have increased in relative cost. 
A similar situation could arise in the.wake of a change in climate, 
with government intervening to prevent price increases in the basic 
food commodities that would be adversely affected by the change, and 
perhaps building price floors (to protect farmers) for commodities 
that have productivity gains from the climate change. In the energy 
sector, attempts to hold down the price of hydrocarbon fuels and to 
subsidize synthetic hydrocarbon will encourage energy consumption and 
retard shifts to energy sources that do not involve combustion of 
hydrocarbons, both of which exacerbate the problem of co2 emissions. 
Nearly every country pursues active pricing policies in both 
agriculture and energy, so that serious work now on how these policies 
might inhibit adjustment to climatic change might provide a useful aid 
to government planning. At the least, such work will provide advance 
warning about problems that might parallel those that arose after the 
1973 Arab Oil Embargo, but that we were not prepared to deal with at 
the time. 
SOCIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN TECHNICAL RESEARCH 
The principal value of technical research on the atmospheric 
warming that may occur in the next hundred years is ±ts use for 
examining the effects on human welfare that climate change will cause. 
Thus, the selection of technical research strategies ought to be made 
in part on the basis of the usefulness of the results for long-term 
economic planning by government entities and by the private sector. 
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The private sector is often overlooked as a beneficiary of this 
information, but it, too, engages in long-term capital investments 
and market planning, perhaps in a more systematic and rational way 
than the government. If soundly based warnings about climate change 
are provided long before the change occurs--that is, within the 
investment planning horizons of private actors--the adjustment costs 
to change can be greatly diminished. Thus, the following discussion 
is an attempt to raise some technical research questions that seem 
especially important to the question of minimizing the costs of the 
impact of atmospheric warming. By providing this kind of information, 
society will be able to make a more informed choice among the 
alternative approaches to the co2 problem if such a choice is feasible, 
and if only adaptive responses are politically feasible, society will 
be better placed to mitigate the effects. 
Because the ultimate concern is not co2 per se, but 
atmospheric warming in general, the question immediately arises about 
the extent to which other man-made emissions may also affect climate, 
and whether these are as serious--and more or less as controllable--
as co2. Several other emissions are known to have a similar relation­
ship, within an order of magnitude, between changes in atmospheric 
concentration and changes in temperature, with some causing cooling 
and others warming.-
/ 
Indeed, the primary climatic change in the last 
-
1 w. c. Wang, Y. L. Yung, A. A. Lacis, T. Mo and J. E. Hansen, 
"Greenhouse Effects Due to Man-Made Perturbations of Trace Gases, " 
Science 194, no. 4266 (November 12, 1976). 
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four decades has been atmospheric cooling, with some suspecting man­
made origins.-
1 
Work should proceed on the combined effect of all 
_I M. K. Miles, "Predicting Temperature Trend in the Northern 
Hemisphere to the Year 2000, " Nature: Climate Supplement 276 
(November 23, 1978}. 
important man-made emissions, not just co2, to obtain better fixes on 
future possible climatic regimes. 
In undertaking research on climate effects, a necessary 
input is projections of emissions. For co2, this involves projections 
of the combustion of hydrocarbon fuels; other emissions arise from 
various relatively well-known industrial sources. 
To date, the work on forecasting paths of emissions has not 
been very sophisticated. A potentially important source of improvement 
in climate forecasts is to improve emissions forecasts. For fuel, 
the key question would seem to be the sensitivity of net co2 emissions 
to the assumptions about growth in the total demand for energy and 
about the mix of energy sources. Thus far, some account has been 
.taken of different splits between hydrocarbons and alternative energy 
sources, but other issues need to be explored. One is whether there 
are important differences among hydrocarbon fuels. Some, like coal, 
are associated with other types of emissions as well, so, in comparison, 
say, to natural gas, may have a different impact on the atmosphere. 
Other fuels are from renewable resources--wood, methane from vegetable 
crops, etc. --which are part of the carbon cycle. What is gained from 
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relying on renewable fuel resources rather than hydrocarbon minerals? 
In dealing with the energy sector, forecasts should try to 
take account of likely future paths of total emissions, and how these 
are likely to be affected by other policies, especially environmental 
regulation. In the industrial sector, emissions other than co2 
probably dominate the picture, and environmental regulation is an 
even more important element of the forecast. Because of significant 
differences in emissions from industry to industry, emissions forecasts 
should also take account of possible shifts in the composition of 
economic activity. 
Of course, reliable point estimates of emissions for decades 
into the future are impossible. Unanticipated technological changes, 
discoveries of new resources, and shifts in the pattern of demand 
among goods will cause massive, probably unpredictable shifts in 
industrial structure and resource consumption in the next hundred 
years. Thus, the focus should be on ranges of estimates that are 
plausible, rather than point estimates. 
The kind of research contemplated here must involve both 
technical experts from science and engineering, who have knowledge 
about the nature and quantity of emissions that are potentially 
important in influencing climate, and economists, who can contribute 
analysis about the paths of economic development that might be followed. 
Both are necessary to obtain a reliable, long-run assessment of man-
made di.mate change. 
Even with the best research effort, however, the dimensions 
of the greenhouse effect are likely to be subject to considerable 
uncertainty for at least three decades and perhaps longer. Effort 
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should be placed on identifying early signals that would enable society 
to eliminate some possibilities from further consideration.-
/ 
The 
_/ For a first look at this issue, see R. Madden and V. Ramanathan, 
"Detecting Climate Change Due to Increasing Carbon Dioxide, " Science 
209, no. 4458 (August 15, 1980). 
research would take the form of specific kinds of predictions that 
deal with necessary precursors to a major warming trend, or that would 
enable a better judgment about the nature of the warming path that is 
being followed -- how warm, how fast, etc. Because some adjustments 
involve long-term capital investments, a steady public release of 
findings that narrow the range of possible outcomes within the 
investment planning horizon prior to major warming could be of 
significant value. 
Finally, in projecting future climates, attention should be 
paid to producing projections on aspects of climate other than 
hemispheric average temperature changes. Indeed, the most important 
feature of climate is probably not the mean annual temperature. Among 
the important features of climate are the frequency and severity of 
storms, annual rainfall, season to season temperature variance and 
the length of the growing season, year to year variance (especially 
in rainfall) , and multiyear cycles, including differing sensitivities 
to changes in solar irradiation, volcanic eruptions, and other 
relatively long-term factors influencing climate. 
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In addition to more detail about dimensions of climate other 
than mean annual temperature, more detail needs to be provided on a 
geographical basis. Only when regional predictions are available can 
the relative merits of different policy options be sensibly compared. 
Thus far the attempts to provide some further detail to the 
predicted effects of atmospheric warming are far from satisfying. 
One method has been to compare the five warmest years in this century 
with average years in terms of rainfall and other climate variables.-1 
_/ T. M. L. Wigley, P. D. Jones and P. M. Kelly, "Scenario for a 
Warm, High co2 World," Nature 283 ( January 3, 1980). 
On several grounds this is an inadequate prediction technique , For 
any given set of background conditions--solar irradiation, atmospheric 
composition, etc.--warmer temperatures are associated with less stormy 
periods. Temperature variance within the context of the same background 
conditions has no necessary connection to a change in mean temperature 
because of changed background conditions. In addition, annual 
variations in weather will provide no insight into long-term feedback 
mechanisms--positive or negative--in the natural system, such as changes 
in ocean currents and ocean-atmosphere interactions. The equilibrium 
adjustment to a warming trend could be significantly affected by these 
secondary effects. Certainly a major research question for the coming 
decade is to examine the sensitivity of climate forecasts to different 
assumptions about background conditions and feedback effects, and, if 
the predictions turn out to be highly sensitive to them, to concentrate 
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more research effort on incorporating more realistic background and 
feedback assumptions into climate forecasting models . 
Other comparisons have been made with historically distant 
periods of climate change: the Medieval warm period from 800 to 1200 
and the following "little ice age " is one such example, as is the 
hypisthermal period about 4000 to 8000 years ago.-1 The more distant 
-1 William W. Kellogg, "Is Mankind Warming the Earth?" Bulletl.n of 
the Atomic Scientists (February 1978). 
historical periods make comparisons difficult because of data limitations. 
Neither the cause of the climate change nor reasonably precise measures 
of the details of the climate is known. 
A high priority item should be to advance technical knowledge 
about the atmosphere and climate, This will permit more details to 
be included in forecasts of the impact of the greenhouse effect--
particularly the geographical distribution of rainfall, the frequency 
of weather disasters, and the length of the growing season. This in 
turn can be fed into the results of research on the effects of various 
climatic variables on agricultural productivity. Only then will it 
make sense to investigate in detail the problem of effective adjustment 
of agriculture to the new climate. 
A final matter of detail that needs to be supplied is the 
likely rate of climatic change. The importance of this knowledge 
relates to the ability of society to make mitigating adjustments. 
The mor<c abrupt is the change, the less is the likelihood that society 
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will b e  able t o  adjust without suffering a major economic impact, 
especially if substantial mitigating investments are required to adjust 
to the new regime. Both politicians and businessmen can be expected 
to be reluctant to begin to make major investments in new agricultural 
methods, water resource systems, and energy capacity before there is 
hard evidence of a warming trend that would justify them. Relatively 
slow increases in temperature, along with other possible features of 
the co2 effect that can produce the "early warning" predictions 
mentioned above, will be likely to facilitate this kind of advance 
planning and investment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The key recommendations in this paper are for the kinds of 
research that will enable us to evaluate a mitigating strategy towards 
the greenhouse effect--or, indeed, pursue one if massive technical 
fixes of the preventative or compensatory type prove infeasible. 
The elements of such a plan are studies about the responsiveness to 
unanticipated change of the industries and activities that are most 
likely to be affected, and research that provides more details about 
the changes they will face, including the path that climate trends 
will follow and the amount of climate change that can be expected by 
particular areas and industries. 
Some consideration should be given to whether better forecasts 
of the conditions of the atmosphere ought to be undertaken prior to 
further attempts to predict the climatic consequences of a change in 
the atmosphere. The concern is that for a while predictions of 
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climatic change may be the product of GIGO, in part because only co2 
is assumed to change and in part because the basis for the forecast 
of co2 emissions is very crude. In a�y event, the general circulation 
models (GCM) that are used to predict the effects of co2 buildup do not 
contain very sophisticated characterizations of background conditions 
and feedback mechanisms, do not produce detailed climatic pictures, 
and do not give us any clue about the speed and path of change. Thus, 
the best strategy is probably to emphasize the development of better, 
more comprehensive atmospheric models that are designed for long-term 
climate forecasting, rather than to continue to run existing short-term 
weather forecasting models under a wider array of initial conditions. 
This is not meant to diminish the contribution of GCM predictions thus 
far. The GCM has served the important function of making us aware of 
the possibility of a severe problem, and has given us a long lead 
time to learn more about the problem and either avoid or cope with it, 
But to move to a new level of understanding about man-made climate 
changes probably requires focusing basic atmospheric and climatic 
research on this particular problem, rather than continuing to borrow 
from work that was designed to serve an entirely different purpose. 
Even if substantial progress is made in improving scientific 
understanding of the problem, society is still likely to face 
considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of the co2 problem for 
many years to come. Indeed, if defensive actions are to be taken, 
there is a good chance that key decisions will have to be made when 
the range of uncertainty is uncomfortably wide. This suggests focusing 
research on identifying actions that are most likely to have significant 
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leverage on human welfare: effects which have critical ranges or 
catastrophe thresholds that are well within the range of uncertainty 
in climate forecasts , which are not likely to be adequately anticipated 
and mitigated by private decisions , and which have a high payoff in 
terms of the possibility that government can be effective in promoting 
mitigation or prevention of s evere consequences . 
